Transportation industry services providers (and their attorneys) have kept close watch on court decisions with respect to preemption of state law negligence claims against motor carriers and brokers. The split among circuits in the Federal Courts of Appeals is well-documented, with the tally of decisions in favor of and against preemption subject to frequent adjustment. Best to use pencil, not pen, in keeping score.

Those writers who have devoted significant time to analyzing the nuances of the latest FAAAA¹ preemption decisions engage the thought exercise with great capability. Nevertheless, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth District, undertook to add its own perspective and, in so doing, set aside the guidance provided by the Ninth Circuit in Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020) (Miller).

Most who follow FAAAA preemption cases would have expected the California Court of Appeal to follow the Ninth Circuit's comprehensive analysis in Miller. After all, Miller is a decision of a Federal Court of Appeals interpreting a federal statute — and California is within the Ninth Circuit's geographical scope. But not this time.

In Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc. (September 10, 2025) 2025 WL 2612041, the California Court of Appeal concluded that state law negligence claims do not fall within the "safety exception" to FAAAA and held that negligence claims against a shipper and its customer were preempted by the FAAAA.²

The Accident³

The Complaint, filed by Christina Casarez, the mother of a young woman, Olivia Mendoza, tells a sad story. On the evening of Sept. 27, 2019, Olivia was driving her Honda Civic, obeying traffic laws and driving with reasonable precaution. A semi-truck and trailer, driven by Andre Hill, collided with Olivia's vehicle at a high rate of speed after failing to observe a posted stop sign. The semi-truck did not stop, even after striking Olivia's vehicle, and instead continued through the intersection to hit another semi-truck. The extreme force of these events resulted in Olivia's death. She was "just 19 years old, was attending college, and had her whole life ahead of her." ⁴ Hill's “extreme fatigue” was deemed by law enforcement to have been a factor in the crash. Hill was ultimately charged with vehicular manslaughter.⁵

The Allegations Against Defendants

Gold Coast Logistics Group owned the semi-truck driven by Hill, its employee. Casarez alleged that Gold Coast did not properly maintain the semi-truck and failed to properly train and supervise Hill, all of which contributed to the accident.⁶ Casarez asserted various negligence claims arising from the accident and sought damages for her loss, compensation for Olivia's estate and funeral expenses.

At the time of the accident, the semi-truck was hauling a load of produce picked up at Irigoyen Farms, a family farm that grows fresh produce for sale to retailers such as Walmart, the customer to which the shipment was headed at the time of the accident.⁷ Irigoyen Farms contracted with broker Royal Violet Logistics, LLC to arrange for the transportation of the shipment. Royal Violet, in turn, contracted with SIO Logistics LLC, also a broker. SIO contracted with Gold Coast, the motor carrier, to perform the actual transportation of the shipment.⁸

Among others, Casarez named both Irigoyen Farms and Walmart as defendants to the lawsuit. Irigoyen Farms and Walmart each moved for summary judgment against Casarez's negligence claims, asserting that the claims were preempted by the FAAAA and, therefore, Casarez's case against them should be dismissed.

In opposition to their motions for summary judgment, Casarez argued that Irigoyen Farms and Walmart were included as defendants based on "their actions and their failures to comply with the industry standards applicable specifically to them, not vicariously for the acts of the motor carrier or broker, or for the broker's negligent hiring of the motor carrier.”⁹

Specifically, she sued Walmart "because its onerous contractual requirements incentivized reckless conduct by motor carriers” and Irigoyen Farms because, "through its employees, it loaded its product on the truck driven by … Hill and sent him on his way despite actual, contemporaneous knowledge he had a long distance to travel, had to be there within just a few hours, yet was obviously already exhausted.”¹⁰

The Ninth Circuit's View on FAAAA Preemption

In 1994, Congress passed the FAAAA, which followed on the spirit of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA).¹¹ The ADA was intended to preempt state laws related to airline prices, routes or services. The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the ADA broadly to apply to state laws covering nearly all aspects of airline operations.¹² Likewise, the FAAAA has been interpreted broadly. However, the FAAAA includes express limits.

The FAAAA is limited to laws, regulations and other provisions having the force and effect of law "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier … broker, or freight forwarder …" But, the FAAAA prohibits restrictions on "the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles …," a concept referred to as the "safety exception."¹³

In Miller, the Ninth Circuit held that “negligence claims against brokers, to the extent that they arise out of motor vehicle accidents, have the requisite ‘connection with’ motor vehicles,” and are within the safety exception to FAAAA preemption.¹⁴

Thus, one would have expected the Casarez court to deny the summary judgment motions of Irigoyen Farms (a shipper) and Walmart (a receiver) because (1) these roles are not expressly included in the FAAAA and, (2) Miller held that state law negligence claims were not preempted by the FAAAA. In fact, the trial court did just that.

The California Court of Appeal's Analysis

On appeal, Casarez argued that the FAAAA's preemption clause, by its express terms, applied only to motor carriers, brokers and freight forwarders, not shippers or receivers.¹⁵ She noted that Irigoyen Farms and Walmart were sued based on their own negligence, not the negligence of other parties (i.e., the brokers and the motor carrier) and, therefore, preemption should not apply because her negligence claims fell within the safety exception.¹⁶

The Casarez court began by focusing on the express language of the statute, noting what was not there. "Nothing in the language suggests a beneficiary of the preemption clause must itself be a motor carrier, broker, or freight forwarder." The court added, "Nothing in the language suggests preemption is limited to claims of vicarious liability." ¹⁷ It relied on California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. County of Fresno, a decision of the California Court of Appeal, for the proposition that when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction, and the court would not indulge it.¹⁸

After a brief discussion of Miller's facts and core holding, the court stated, "[W]e point out 'federal decisions may be persuasive, but California courts are not bound by the decisions of the lower federal courts.' [Citations] We have no obligation to follow Miller." ¹⁹ The Court of Appeal not only felt free to disregard Miller, it found Miller's rationale "deficient."²⁰

The Court of Appeal explained that the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Miller was improperly influenced by a presumption that Congress typically does not intend to supplant state law but, where a statute contains an express preemption clause, the plain wording of the statute should be the focus of the analysis because it is the best evidence of Congressional intent.²¹

The Court of Appeal next commented on the Ninth Circuit's failure to appreciate the distinction between "with respect to" and "related to" as used within the FAAAA, where it states the law's preemptive effect applies to matters "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier…broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property," but not restricting "the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles …"²²  Relying on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger, the court found Miller's interpretation of the statutory language too expansive, such that it "enables the safety exception to swallow the preemption clause."²³

The Court of Appeal then circled back to Casarez's characterizations of why she sued Irigoyen Farms and Walmart, held that FAAAA preemption applied, and concluded that Casarez's claims could not be saved by the safety exception. "She 'sued Walmart because its onerous contractual requirements incentivized reckless conduct by motor carriers' and 'sued Irigoyen Farms because, through its employees, it loaded its product on the truck driven by … Hill and sent him on his way despite actual, contemporaneous knowledge he had a long distance to travel, had to be there within just a few hours, yet was obviously already exhausted.' These claims do not purport the tractor trailer itself was defective or other otherwise unsafe. Therefore, the FAAAA's safety exception does not apply here."²⁴

Perspective

Federal Courts of Appeal do not agree on the scope of FAAAA preemption and the safety exception, of course.  Those courts have invested significant thought in rendering decisions on the subject, however.  In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal not only disregarded the Ninth Circuit's view, such as it is, but appears to have reached two curious conclusions. 

First, the Court of Appeal apparently does not consider incentivizing "reckless conduct by motor carriers" to be a matter of safety, subject to state law negligence concepts.  It was Walmart's contract that allegedly incentivized the reckless conduct, which would move the theory of recovery against Walmart away from negligence to perhaps a breach of contract and, therefore, not a matter of safety?  If that is what the court intended, it does not say so.  In any event, Casarez would somehow have to demonstrate third-party beneficiary status to sue on the inherently negligent contract, which requires extremely eccentric thinking at each step.

Likewise, the court does not consider sending an "obviously already exhausted" driver onto the road to be a matter of safety. Here, the better focus might have been on whether the shipper had a duty to assess whether the driver was sufficiently rested, but the issue of legal duty was either not before the court or the court chose not to address it.

The court's decision also took a strange turn in suggesting that Casarez's claims might not have been preempted had she purported the tractor-trailer itself was defective or other otherwise unsafe. I suppose this legal theory would be in the nature of negligent design, but that would seem to be a matter of safety.

Second, although the court claims to have focused on the statute's express language in crafting an independent but fanciful view of preemption and the safety exception, it departed from its own rule. It applied preemptive effect to claims against a shipper and receiver of cargo, not parties expressly identified in the statute. The Court of Appeal observed that nothing in the express statutory language suggests a beneficiary of the preemption clause must itself be a motor carrier, broker, or freight forwarder, but it does not follow that enumerating certain types of actors within a list leaves room for the addition of "and anyone else", especially when taking a strict approach to statutory construction, which the court claims to do.

Practically, it makes sense that shippers and receivers of cargo will rarely undertake action that contributes to catastrophic accidents. Shippers, in particular, are often brought into casualty litigation without any facts that would support a conclusion that the loading, distribution or securement of the cargo or its inherent nature contributed to an accident. Perhaps the court felt a nagging sense that Casarez should not be able to continue her lawsuit against Irigoyen Farms and Walmart because their connections to the accident were too attenuated.

In my view, however, there are intellectually superior, less catastrophic roads toward that result.

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¹Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14501.

²Casarez is an unpublished and "non-citable" decision but interesting nonetheless given that trends in the law sometimes begin this way.

³The facts stated here are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint. Because the case was decided on a motion for summary judgment, these facts were not proven with evidence and are provided for purposes of context only.

⁴Complaint, Fresno County Superior Court, Case No. 19CECG03758, p. 5, Ex. 1.

⁵Casarez, 2025 WL 2612041 at *2. ⁶Complaint, p. 5.

⁶ Id. at *1.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Casarez at *2, emphasis in original. 

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).

¹²See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 504 U.S. 374 (1992); American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995); Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273 (2014).

¹³49 USC § 14501(c)(1) and (c)(2)(A).

¹⁴Miller, 976 F.3d 1016, 1031.   

¹⁵Casarez at *5.

¹⁶Here, she argued essentially that, in the FAAAA preemption game, absent indisputable evidence, the Ninth Circuit's call on the (preemption) field stands.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Casarez at *5 citing California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. County of Fresno (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 250, 266.

¹⁹Casarez at *6, citing Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians v. Lexington Ins. Co. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1071, citing People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86; accord, Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 352.

²⁰Casarez at *6.

²¹Ibid.

²²49 USC § 14501 (c)(1) and (2)(A); emphasis added.

²³Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger, 65 F.4th 1261(11th Cir. 2023); Casarez at *7.

²⁴Casarez at *8.