Beyond the Driver’s Seat: What Montgomery and Casarez Mean for California Shippers and Agricultural Companies
Beyond the Driver’s Seat: What Montgomery and Casarez Mean for California Shippers and Agricultural Companies
On November 16, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated a California appellate decision that had shielded a Selma, California grower and Walmart Inc. from a wrongful death suit arising out of a Fresno County trucking collision. The Court remanded Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc.1 to the Fifth District Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC,2 decided in May.
Much of the focus following the Montgomery decision has been on the impact on brokers,3 but the decision has significant implications for companies further upstream within supply chains and transportation networks, such as shippers and receivers, including within the agriculture industry. Casarez shows that liability for a trucking accident does not stop with the driver and the carrier, that the federal preemption defense many agricultural companies and shippers have relied on may no longer be available, and that significant liability questions remain unresolved.
Executive Summary
- Liability reaches beyond the driver. In Casarez, a grower and a retailer were sued for their own conduct, not the carrier’s, even though neither owned the truck, employed the driver, or chose the carrier.
- Two questions remain open. Montgomery did not decide whether the safety exception reaches parties upstream of the broker, or whether shippers and receivers fall within the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act’s (FAAAA) preemption clause at all.
- Preemption is no longer a reliable defense for agricultural shippers. No binding California appellate decision now holds that claims against shippers or receivers are preempted. The fight shifts to state-law duty and causation.
- Safety practices should stop short of control. Agricultural companies and shippers should act on what they observe at their own facilities without directing how carriers operate, and should rely on contracts to allocate risk.
The Casarez Case
On the evening of September 27, 2019, a tractor-trailer heading north on Clovis Avenue ran the stop sign at Mountain View Avenue, a route familiar to anyone who moves product in the Valley. It struck a car driven by 19-year-old Olivia Mendoza, who died at the scene. The driver had picked up produce at Irigoyen Farms in Selma for delivery to a Walmart distribution center in Nevada. Law enforcement found that the driver’s extreme fatigue contributed to the crash. The driver was later charged with vehicular manslaughter.4
The load moved through a chain of contracts common in produce. Irigoyen Farms hired a broker, Royal Violet Logistics. Royal Violet hired a second broker, SIO Logistics. SIO hired the carrier, Gold Coast Logistics Group. Gold Coast hired the driver as an independent contractor and supplied the truck.5
Liability reaches past the driver. The victim’s mother did not sue the grower and the retailer for what the carrier or driver did under common theories of negligence and vicarious liability. Instead, she sued them for their own conduct. She alleged that Irigoyen Farms’ dock employees loaded the truck and released the driver despite knowing he had a long distance to travel, a tight delivery deadline, and was visibly exhausted. She also alleged that Walmart’s delivery requirements pushed carriers toward reckless driving.6 Neither company owned the truck, employed the driver, or chose the carrier.
The Fresno County Superior Court granted summary judgment to both defendants in 2023, holding the claims preempted under the FAAAA. In a published 2025 decision, the Fifth District affirmed on two grounds. It held that federal preemption can protect shippers and receivers, not just carriers and brokers. And it held that the federal safety exception applies only where a claim has a direct connection to the vehicle.7
The FAAAA and Montgomery
The FAAAA bars states from enforcing laws “related to a price, route, or service” of a motor carrier, broker, or freight forwarder “with respect to the transportation of property.”8 Congress sought to keep a deregulated interstate trucking market free of a burdensome state-by-state patchwork that would interfere with interstate commerce. But the statute excluded the “safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles,” which includes state tort law.9
In Montgomery, a unanimous Supreme Court held that this safety exception saves a negligent-hiring claim against a freight broker that selected an unsafe carrier. A claim is “with respect to motor vehicles,” the Court held, if it concerns the vehicles used in transportation.10 The Court rejected the narrow interpretation of the safety exception adopted by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits on which the Fifth District relied in Casarez.11 In light of that decision and its broader interpretation of the safety exception, the Supreme Court sent the case back to the Fifth District to determine whether the claims against Walmart and Irigoyen Farms are still preempted or whether they can be resolved on other grounds.
Two Open Questions
Montgomery left two questions open that matter directly to transportation and logistics and the agriculture industry.
Does the safety exception reach further upstream?
Montgomery addressed a broker’s choice of carrier. It did not decide how the exception applies to parties further up the supply chain, such as agricultural companies, shippers, receivers, manufacturers, and suppliers. The Casarez plaintiff argues that if a broker’s failure to vet a carrier concerns motor vehicles, a shipper’s direct observation of an exhausted driver does so even more clearly, as does a receivers aggressive service demands.12
Are shippers within the preemption clause at all?
This question has drawn less attention. Montgomery assumed, without deciding, that the preemption clause covered the claim against the broker.13 Whether a claim against a grower or retailer—which is not a carrier, broker, or freight forwarder—falls within the clause in the first place remains unresolved. The Fifth District held that it does, but that decision has been vacated in order for the court to apply the Supreme Court’s broader safety exception.14
The bottom line.
As of today, no binding California appellate decision holds that claims against shippers or receivers are preempted.15 Accordingly, agricultural companies cannot plan on federal preemption protecting them from liability, even if there are intervening parties that help arrange or facilitate transportation. Without the guarantee of preemption, state negligence law, particularly the duty of care standard, will determine liability and must be incorporated into company operations. Walmart has already asked the Fifth District to affirm on the ground that no such duty exists in California.16
Guidance for Agricultural Companies and Shippers
Mind the control line. Throughout Montgomery, industry groups stressed that shippers and brokers do not operate trucks, supervise drivers, or control equipment.17 That distinction remains one of the strongest defenses under state law, and policies should be drafted to preserve it. A policy that directs how a carrier operates, such as its routes, hours, or driver assignments, invites the argument that the company retained control of the work and assumed a duty to perform it carefully. Additionally, as Hanson Bridgett explained in its October 19 alert, a party that voluntarily undertakes to protect others can be held liable for performing that undertaking carelessly. A safety policy that is adopted but enforced inconsistently can become the plaintiff’s best exhibit.18
Nor can agricultural companies simply ignore the issue. The claim against the grower in Casarez rested on what its dock employees saw, not on any control it exercised. The right approach governs a company’s own premises and decisions, stops short of controlling the carrier, and relies on contracts to allocate the remaining risk.
Until the scope of FAAAA preemption is resolved, consider the following steps:
- Manage where your business intersects with transportation and logistics. Adopt a written protocol for when staff observe a driver who appears impaired or unfit: whom to notify at the carrier or broker, how to document it, and when to hold the load. Train on it, apply it consistently, and keep it focused on whether to release your product rather than on how the carrier runs its operation.
- Assess delivery windows and buyer terms. Review pickup windows, delivery deadlines, and on-time penalties, including those imposed by buyers, for anything that could be portrayed as pressuring drivers to exceed hours-of-service limits.19 Build in realistic transit times for long hauls.
- Select carriers and brokers on criteria you can verify. Companies that book carriers directly should follow and document a reasonable selection process based on carrier-level information, such as operating authority, safety rating, and insurance. Do not review or approve individual drivers. Do not assume using a broker will insulate your company from liability arising from the carrier or driver’s conduct.
- Address re-brokering. The Casarez load passed through two brokers before reaching a carrier. Broker agreements should require notice or consent before a load is re-brokered.
- Require carrier representations and indemnity. Broker and carrier agreements should include the carrier’s representations of regulatory compliance, appropriate indemnities, and additional-insured status. Update legacy agreements at renewal.
- Check insurance coverage. Review whether general liability and umbrella policies respond to claims arising from a third party’s truck accident. Auto exclusions can leave gaps.
Anticipate Further Developments
The Fifth District’s decision on remand will likely be the first California appellate ruling to apply Montgomery to shippers and receivers. If published, it will bind California trial courts. Key issues include whether shippers fall within the preemption clause at all, how the safety exception applies to them, and whether California law imposes a duty of care in these circumstances. Follow-on decisions nationally will also shape the landscape.
Agricultural companies should not wait for the courts. Reviewing dock practices, delivery terms, and transportation contracts now is the most effective way to reduce liability exposure.
1 Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., No. 25-1421 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2026) (order granting certiorari, vacating judgment, and remanding); Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 5th 873 (2025), vacated, No. 25-1421 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2026).
2 Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, 608 U.S. 219 (2026).
3 Gregory R. Reed, Supreme Court Unanimously Holds Negligent-Hiring Claims Against Freight Brokers Survive FAAAA Preemption, Hanson Bridgett (May 14, 2026), https://www.hansonbridgett.com/publication/260514_8509_supreme-court-faaaa; Linda Chiem, Freight Brokers Brace For New Risks After High Court Ruling, Law360 (May 14, 2026), https://www.law360.com/articles/2477855.
4 Casarez, 114 Cal. App. 5th at 877–78.
5 Id. at 878.
6 Id. at 878–79.
7 Id. at 879–80, 884–88.
8 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
9 Id. § 14501(c)(2)(A); Montgomery, 608 U.S. at 226 (common-law duties and standards of care form part of a state’s authority to regulate safety).
10 Montgomery, 608 U.S. at 226–27.
11 See id. at 225 & n.1; Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023); Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023); Casarez, 114 Cal. App. 5th at 886–87 (adopting Aspen’s “direct connection” test).
12 See Linda Chiem, Justices Void Calif. Walmart Crash Win After Montgomery, Law360 (Nov. 16, 2026) (quoting petition for writ of certiorari).
13 Montgomery, 608 U.S. at 225 n.2.
14 Casarez, 114 Cal. App. 5th at 884–85.
15 See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455 (1962).
16 See Chiem, supra note 13 (quoting Walmart’s brief in response).
17 Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Association of Manufacturers, supra note 12, at 2–3.
18 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (Am. L. Inst. 1965); id. § 324A; see Reed, Off the Registry, supra note 3 (explaining that a party that undertakes to protect others may be liable for performing that undertaking carelessly, and that vicarious liability turns on operational control).
19 See 49 C.F.R. pt. 395.
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