In Grimberg v. Pour (2026), the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, addressed an important jurisdictional question: May a party directly appeal a probate court order authorizing the recording of a lis pendens — a public notice that pending litigation may affect identified real property? The Court said no. Even when the order arguably falls within the categories of appealable probate orders listed in Probate Code section 1300, the more specific lis pendens statutes control. Review must be sought through an expedited petition for writ of mandate.

The case arose from a dispute involving an irrevocable family trust. After the settlor purportedly appointed her niece as successor trustee, the settlor’s son challenged the appointment and sought the successor trustee’s removal and surcharge. He alleged that the trustee diverted rental income, withdrew substantial cash, and transferred trust assets to herself. The settlor’s guardian ad litem asked the probate court to authorize lis pendens against three properties the trustee personally owned, seeking to prevent those assets from being placed beyond the reach of a potential surcharge judgment. The trustee opposed the request, arguing that the probate petitions sought only monetary relief and did not assert a “real property claim” affecting title to or possession of her properties. The probate court authorized the notices to be re-recorded, and the trustee filed a direct appeal nearly two months later.

The trustee argued that the order was appealable under Probate Code section 1300 — making orders “[d]irecting, authorizing, approving, or confirming the … encumbrance … of property” appealable — because it authorized an encumbrance of property and directed a fiduciary. The Court of Appeal assumed, without deciding, that a lis pendens could qualify as an “encumbrance” and that the guardian ad litem could qualify as a “fiduciary.” Even so, the appellate court held that those general appealability provisions did not override Code of Civil Procedure section 405.39, which makes lis pendens rulings nonappealable and provides for review by writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal relied on Probate Code sections 1000 and 1004, which incorporate civil practice rules — and specifically the Code of Civil Procedure’s lis pendens framework — into probate proceedings. Put simply, the Probate Code itself directed the parties to the more specific lis pendens procedure.

The appellate court also rejected the trustee’s argument that section 405.39 did not apply because she was appealing an order authorizing recordation, rather than an order granting or denying expungement. A property owner challenging an improper lis pendens must first move to expunge it, then seek writ review of the resulting ruling. The trustee could not “manufacture appellate jurisdiction” by bypassing the expungement procedure and directly appealing the authorization order. The Court of Appeal looked to the order’s practical effect, not its label. The trustee’s claim that the underlying petitions did not contain a real property claim was exactly the issue a motion to expunge would have resolved. Allowing a direct appeal would therefore create different review procedures for functionally identical lis pendens disputes.

The decision offers an important warning for probate practitioners: identifying an order that appears to fall within Probate Code section 1300 is only the first step in the jurisdictional analysis. Counsel must also determine whether a more specific statutory scheme governs the order and establishes an exclusive method of review. When a lis pendens is involved, counsel should promptly consider moving to expunge and should calendar section 405.39’s 20-day deadline for filing and serving a writ petition. The trial court may grant one extension of no more than 10 days, but the request must be made within the initial 20-day period. The practical lesson is straightforward but consequential: even a potentially meritorious challenge may never be heard if counsel chooses the wrong appellate vehicle.