In Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (2026), decided July 16, 2026, the California Supreme Court put an end to a recurring litigation strategy: voluntarily dismissing an entire action with prejudice — while viable claims remain pending and leave to amend is still open — in an effort to convert unfavorable interlocutory rulings into an appealable final judgment. The Supreme Court unanimously held that this approach cannot manufacture appellate jurisdiction. A voluntary dismissal entered under those circumstances operates only to terminate the action entirely, forfeiting any right to challenge the rulings that preceded it. The Supreme Court also took the opportunity to disapprove of two Court of Appeal decisions to the extent they had permitted such appeals, and clarified the proper procedural paths for obtaining expedited review.

This case arose from a surgical mishap that exposed a hospital worker to a patient’s HIV-positive blood. The hospital worker and his wife sued the physician and his employer medical group asserting claims for general negligence, assault, battery, unfair business practices, and loss of consortium. Defendants demurred to all claims except the loss of consortium claim, and moved to strike certain requested relief, including punitive damages, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest.

The trial court overruled the demurrer as to the negligence claim, but sustained it with 20 days leave to amend as to the remaining claims. The court also granted the motion to strike. Five days before the amendment period expired, plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal of the entire action with prejudice, accompanied by a declaration stating the dismissal was filed solely to expedite appellate review. This declaration cited cases — including Austin v. Valverde (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 546, and Flowers v. Prasad (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 930 — for the proposition that a voluntary dismissal entered after an adverse ruling is tantamount to an appealable judgment. Plaintiffs then filed a notice of appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the clerk’s entry of a voluntary dismissal is a ministerial act from which no appeal lies. The California Supreme Court granted review, and affirmed on two independent grounds.

First, the voluntary dismissal entered before final adjudication terminated the action. A voluntary dismissal is a ministerial act entered by the clerk, not a judicial determination, and affords the appellate court no jurisdiction to review prior rulings. Because the trial court had not foreclosed any of plaintiffs’ claims at the time of dismissal — the demurrer had been sustained with leave to amend, the amendment period had not expired, and the negligence and loss of consortium claims were untouched — the dismissal simply ended the case and forfeited any right to appeal.

Second, allowing the appeal would violate the one final judgment rule. Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded at oral argument that a successful appeal would result in reinstatement of all claims pleaded in the complaint. The Supreme Court, analogizing to Kurwa v. Kislinger (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1097, held that using a dismissal to obtain interlocutory review while keeping unadjudicated claims in reserve is precisely the piecemeal appellate review the final judgment rule prohibits.

The Supreme Court disapproved Austin and Flowers, both of which had permitted appeals from voluntary dismissals entered after rulings that merely limited, rather than foreclosed, the action. An adverse interlocutory ruling, however significant, does not transform a subsequent voluntary dismissal into an appealable judgment. The Supreme Court distinguished the narrower Ashland Chemical Co. v. Provence (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 790 scenario: where the voluntary dismissal was preceded by the entry of an adverse order that, while not a final judgment, nonetheless constituted a final ruling on the merits of the action.

Maniago closes a procedural shortcut and carries a clear message — a voluntary dismissal entered before the trial court has issued a final ruling disposing of any claim simply ends the case, it does not preserve claims for appeal. When facing an adverse interlocutory ruling, the right move is a petition for writ of mandate, not a dismissal designed to manufacture a judgment. For counsel determined to reach the Court of Appeal more quickly through dismissal, the only viable path requires waiting for an order of dismissal on the adjudicated claims and abandoning the untouched claims. Any voluntary dismissal intended to generate appellate review carries real jurisdictional risk, and appellate counsel should be consulted before that step is taken.