By statute, if a case is not “brought to trial” within five years, it is subject to a dismissal for delay in prosecution. But the question becomes: what does “brought to trial” mean exactly? In Wilson v. Johnson (Case No. B329690, September 22, 2026), California’s Second District Court of Appeal held that a case is “brought to trial” when a panel of prospective jurors is impaneled and sworn, not when the parties begin their voir dire examination.

The case arose from a personal injury action filed in 2017. Under Code of Civil Procedure, a case must be “brought to trial” within “five years after the action is commenced.” (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 583.310, 583.360.) However, because the action was filed before April 6, 2020, the California Rules of Court emergency rule extended the statutory deadline by six months. (Cal. Rules of Court, appen. I, emergency rule 10(a).) Thus, the parties agreed that the last day to bring the action to trial was in March 2023.

A jury panel was assembled and sworn just four days prior to the five-year expiration deadline, following various continuances, the parties’ announcement that they were ready for trial, and several days of motions in limine. That day, and over the course of the next two court days, the court questioned the prospective jurors about hardship excusals and their ability to serve as jurors, during which the deadline expired. The court’s hardship questioning lasted past the five-year deadline. Respondents moved to dismiss the action under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.360. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the case, concluding that it had not been brought to trial because the prospective jurors were not “ready for voir dire to commence” by the deadline.

On appeal, the issue became whether the five-year deadline had elapsed, which turned on whether the case was “brought to trial,” at the time a jury was impaneled or at the time voir dire began. The Second District relied on guidance from Stueve v. Nemer (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 746, 750, which held that a jury is impaneled and sworn — thereby bringing the action to trial — when a panel of prospective jurors assembles in a courtroom for voir dire and is sworn to truthfully answer questions concerning the prospective jurors’ qualifications and ability to serve. The Stueve court interpreted the Trial Jury Selection and Management Act (§ 190 et seq.; the Act), which consistently uses the word “panel” to refer to a group of prospective jurors assigned to a courtroom for voir dire, and which requires the panel to be sworn pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 232, subdivision (a), prior to voir dire examination. (Stueve, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 750–752.)

Applying that principle, the Second District concluded the action was brought to trial prior to the five-year expiration when the panel of prospective jurors assigned to the courtroom assembled and swore the oath to answer truthfully. Respondents argued the jury was not impaneled within the deadline because the jury panel did not assemble “for the purposes of voir dire,” but for the purposes of the hardship questioning. However, the court held that assembling for hardship questioning and assembling for voir dire were one and the same, and “that the trial court examined the sworn panels about hardship excusals is consistent with the panels’ having assembled for voir dire.” The fact that the parties’ voir dire examination did not begin until after the deadline was immaterial.

For practitioners, the decision offers helpful guidance on calendaring and the practicalities of pretrial procedural delays. Because the statutory five-year period runs from the date the action is commenced, litigators should calendar the deadline conservatively and build in time to account for courtroom availability and pretrial motions. Importantly, announcing ready for trial and even commencing motions in limine does not “bring the action to trial” for purposes of the statutory deadline — only the assembly and swearing of a jury panel accomplishes that.